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ABSTRACT 
 
 
Guilt by Association: United States Ties and Vulnerability to Transnational Terrorist 
Attacks.  
(December 2010) 
Matthew Grant Warhol, B.A., Texas A&M University 
Chair of Advisory Committee: Dr. Michael T. Koch 
 
Do nations‟ allies and trading partners affect their vulnerability to transnational 
terrorist attacks?  Prior research has focused on how the attributes of individual nations, 
such as regime type, economic stability, and international power, affect their likelihood 
of being the target of transnational terrorist attacks.  However, prior research has not 
addressed the impact of a nation‟s economic and foreign policy ties on this phenomenon. 
Specifically, the question I ask is whether terrorists attempt to indirectly affect the status 
quo policy stance of a powerful nation by attacking the allies and trading partners of that 
nation. I develop a theoretical framework to explain why terrorists are likely to target 
allies of powerful nations in the international arena to force the more powerful nation to 
change its policy stance. Focusing on the United States, I examine how a nation‟s 
economic and foreign policy ties to the U.S. affect its vulnerability to transnational 
terrorist attacks.  I test my expectations using the ITERATE database of transnational 
terrorist events from 1968 to 2000.  The results suggest that a nation‟s economic and 
foreign policy ties may have a significant impact on its vulnerability to transnational 
terrorism. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
On March 11, 2004, 191 individuals were killed and more than 1,200 were 
injured by deadly terrorist attacks on commuter trains and stations in Madrid. These 
attacks had an enormous impact on the citizens of Spain, as well as the entire 
international community.  The Madrid bombings, along with other deadly terrorist 
attacks such as the subway attacks in London the next year, have opened up many 
scholars‟ and politicians‟ eyes to an alarming trend among international terrorist groups 
in the twenty-first century. That is, as recent attacks illustrate, and as Rosendorff and 
Sandler (2005) discuss, nations who support a prime-target nation, such as the United 
States, may themselves become a target of transnational terrorism. Although this idea 
has been discussed in previous work, to the best of my knowledge there has not been an 
empirical study to test if this expectation holds.  Therefore, the purpose of this paper is 
to examine whether a nation‟s allies and trading partners truly do affect its vulnerability 
to transnational terrorism. Specifically, the question I ask is whether terrorist 
organizations might target a specific nation to influence that nation‟s more powerful ally 
and trading partner. Examining this question is necessary to advance the existing 
literature on transnational terrorism from both a theoretical and policy perspective.  The 
attacks on Madrid provided a wakeup call to Europeans regarding their vulnerability to 
transnational terrorist activity, just as 9/11 did for those in the United States. 
 
____________ 
This thesis follows the style of the American Political Science Review. 
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The attacks on Madrid provided a wakeup call to Europeans regarding their vulnerability 
to transnational terrorist activity, just as 9/11 did for those in the United States.  Many 
European leaders did not take the threat of transnational terrorism seriously, despite 
Europe‟s role as an active center for terrorist support activity (Gunaratna 2004). 
In fact, some leaders believed that al-Qaeda had spared the continent because of its 
policy of tolerating terrorist support infrastructures.  However, the attacks in Madrid and 
London opened European leaders‟ eyes to the threat violent terrorist organizations pose 
to their home nations causing them to immediately take strides to prevent future attacks.  
Among the first questions the leaders of these nations were forced to consider were why 
their homeland had been the target of such large scale transnational terrorist activity. 
I argue that the answer to this question lies in Spanish support of US operations 
against al-Qaeda. Enders and Sandler (2006) provide support for this view with their 
argument that the attacks on Madrid were intended to send a warning to other nations 
that cooperation with the United States in its “War on Terror” may carry additional 
costs. One unanticipated effect of these attacks was the victory of the Socialists over the 
ruling Partido Popular party in Spain in the next election.  More importantly, this 
occurrence led to a sharp reduction in Spanish support for U.S. foreign policy initiatives 
in the Middle East. Potentially, a large number of nations could begin to follow Spain‟s 
footsteps and begin to break ties with the United States to protect themselves from 
blowback of American foreign policy actions in their domestic realm (Goh 2003).  The 
loss of support from even a small number of influential nations in the international 
community would have an enormous impact on the U.S. led global War on Terror.  If a 
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large number of nations, particularly in Europe, refuse to associate with the United 
States‟ foreign policy goals, the United States could find itself isolated, not by its own 
will, but due to the actions of other nations.  
However, were the attacks on Spain and their subsequent withdraw from the 
“coalition of the willing” in Iraq an anomaly or part of a more predictable process? 
Specifically, do terrorist organizations target nations with strong foreign policy and 
economic ties to powerful and influential nations such as the United States at a higher 
rate than those that do not? The goal of this paper is to provide answers to these 
questions.  
In the next section of the paper, I discuss the prior literature on transnational 
terrorism. The third section develops a theoretical framework to show why terrorists may 
target the ally or trading partner of their primary target in an effort to force the primary 
target into making concessions.  I then develop a set of hypotheses based on the 
theoretical framework and test my expectations by examining a nation's economic and 
foreign policy ties with the United States and how these ties affect that nation‟s 
vulnerability to transnational terrorist attacks.  The results suggest that a nation‟s allies 
and trading partners do affect its vulnerability to transnational terrorist attacks. 
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2. PREVIOUS TERRORISM LITERATURE 
 The study of terrorist actors and organizations has seen a continued maturation in 
both theoretical and methodological development over the past few decades.  The 
common perception is that terrorists are irrational extremists who do not act with any 
other purpose than to instill fear and suffering in the hearts and minds of the individuals 
they directly attack, a view often fostered by the media (Sandler et. al 1983). Moreover, 
terrorists are often portrayed as low skilled, uneducated individuals with no other choice 
than to join extremist groups.  However, numerous scholars have shown that terrorist 
actors are often highly skilled, well-educated individuals (Kreuger and Maleckova 2003; 
Bueno de Mesquita 2005) who are extremely strategic rational actors (Crenshaw 
1981;1998; 2004; Sandler and Lapan 1988; Hoffman 1998; Pape 2003). For my purpose, 
I use Sandler and Lapan‟s (1988) definition of rationality as an agent‟s response to its 
constraints in achieving its objective1.  Moreover, following the rational-actor 
framework, scholars have shown that terrorists do not choose their targets at random, but 
rather that they make a rational, well calculated choice based on perceived risks 
(Mickoulus 1980; Sandler et al. 1983).  
 In addition, research has shown that terrorist organizations have specific goals 
and strategies for going about achieving their objectives (Kydd and Walter 2006).  Many 
terrorist organizations display strong patterns in not only their prescribed goals, but in 
the strategies they employ as well. Moreover, scholars have increasingly shown that 
terrorists are extremely cognizant of signaling from potential targets, that they base their 
                                                 
1 See Sandler et al. 1983; Atkinson et al. 1987;  and Sandler and Scott 1987 for empirical support of this 
rational-actor viewpoint 
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attacks based on a mix of internal and external stimuli (Hoffman 1998), and that they are 
willing and able to adapt based on these perceptions (Sandler and Lapan 1988; Martin 
2003).   
Enders and Sandler‟s (1993; 2002; 2006) work regarding the substitution effect 
in transnational terrorism provides the most comprehensive empirical analysis of the 
above developments.  This work shows that terrorists rationally substitute one mode or 
venue of attack over another based on internal and external stimuli such as a shift in a 
national security policy.  Terrorists perform a cost-benefit analysis of one method of 
attack over another and allocate their resources toward the path that provides the highest 
probability of success. Essentially, terrorists seek out the “weakest link” and direct their 
attacks toward that “soft” target.  This “weakest link” can be a particular nation in the 
international system, as was the case for Spain due to increased security policies of the 
United States, or a particular mode of attack that provides a greater likelihood of success 
than others due to the current security environment. An example of this is the installation 
of metal detectors in airports (begun in 1973) which decreased skyjackings and threats, 
but increased other kinds of hostage incidents not protected by detectors.  
 Due to this willingness and ability of terrorists organizations to evolve and make 
adaptations in their methods of attack, combined with the highly dispersed global 
network various terrorist organizations display, scholars and policy makers alike have 
come to the conclusion that the “War on Terror” cannot be fought from a unilateral 
perspective by the United States or any other superpower,  but rather needs to be 
approached in a highly consolidated effort across the globe (Crenshaw 2004; Riedel 
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2007). As discussed above, as long as there is a “weakest link” present, terrorists are 
likely and able to exploit it.  Though this view is widely shared, recent history shows us 
that little has been done to move toward this consolidation of powerful nations joined by 
a common goal of eliminating transnational terrorism. There are numerous hindrances 
involved with attempting to develop a comprehensive global collective action force to 
combat transnational terrorism.  Among these problems, which is the focus of this 
analysis, is the fear of backlash from supporting counterterrorism operations and 
regimes.  
Numerous works that focus on transnational terrorism have focused on why 
terrorist organizations attack specific targets in an effort to achieve their goals.  This 
work has primarily focused on what makes a particular target, most commonly nations, 
vulnerable to these violent incidents. Many scholars have focused on the effect of a 
nation‟s regime type on their vulnerability to attacks (Li 2005; Wade and Reiter 2005; 
Drakos and Gofas 2007; Koch and Cranmer 2007).  Other works have concentrated on 
the effect a nation‟s level of power, the prevailing religion of a particular nation (e.g. 
Muslim), and the region a nation is located in and how these various factors influence a 
nation‟s vulnerability to transnational terrorist incidents  
( Sobek and Braithwaite 2005; Drakos and Gofas 2006 ). Li and Shuab (2004) discuss 
how economic globalization and integration affect the likelihood of terrorist attacks 
against a nation. However, as discussed above, there has not been much attention given 
to how a nation‟s allies and trading partners might affect that nation‟s vulnerability to 
transnational terrorism.  
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3. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
 In this analysis, terrorism is defined as the premeditated or threatened use of 
extra-normal violence or force to obtain a political, religious, or ideological objective 
through the intimidation of a large audience (Enders and Sandler 1999; 2002). For my 
purpose, I focus on transnational terrorism.  A transnational terrorist incident in a 
country involves victims, perpetrators, targets, or institutions of another country.  Based 
on the incident venue, transnational terrorist incidents can involve (1) terrorist attacks 
initiated by foreign terrorists against some domestic target in a country, (2) attacks by 
domestic terrorists against some foreign target in a country, or (3) attacks by foreign 
terrorists against some other foreign target in a country (Li 2005).   
 As discussed earlier, terrorist organizations have particular goals and employ 
various strategies to attain them. Most transnational terrorism involves the use of 
strategic coercion by terrorists in an effort to force concessions from their target 
government in order to reach the individual actor‟s or group‟s desired goals (Pape 2003).  
Acting in the rational-actor framework defined in the previous section, terrorists must 
determine the method of coercion which will produce the highest likelihood of success.   
 The strategic coercion that terrorists engage in can be thought of as similar to 
crimes of extortion, which have received extensive attention in numerous fields of study, 
particularly criminology.  In fact, some scholars have discussed the ways in which 
terrorism and organized crime mirror each other, specifically in the manner in which 
they use methods of extortion in an effort to force their targets into making concessions 
(Sanderson 2004).  Extortion is a form of predatory or exploitative crime distinguished 
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by the relationship between the criminal and the target. In extortion, the two actors strike 
a bargain: the extortionist threatens to injure a hostage unless the target agrees to pay a 
ransom (Best 1982). The hostage can be a person (kidnapping), property (racketeering), 
or a reputation (blackmail). The reason that the tactic of extortion is effective is that the 
threat of future harm is believable and credible due to the fact that the extortionist is 
already in control of the hostage. The target must decide whether to pay the ransom 
based on whether they value the hostage more or less than the costs of paying the 
ransom. 
In the case of transnational terrorism, the two actors are the terrorists and their  
potential target. The terrorist actor or organization is the extortionist while the hostage is 
the target government of the terrorist organization. The ransom that the terrorists want is 
for the target to make the terrorists‟ desired concession.  The injury that will be inflicted 
on the target if they do not concede is a future attack. As discussed, in the case of the 
extortionist, their credibility is established through control of a hostage. Terrorists, in 
order to be effective in their strategic coercion of their target government, must establish 
the same level of credibility in their threats of future attacks. The most effective way of 
doing this for terrorists is through past actions which send strong signals to the 
international community. If terrorists have already shown that they are willing to attack a 
given target through previous direct attacks, or that they are willing to attack a similar 
target of which the same concessions were demanded, they will send a credible signal to 
the target government that they are able and willing to attack. Moreover, if the targets of 
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past games of coercion have conceded to the terrorists‟ demands and have been spared 
from an attack, the terrorists‟ credibility is strengthened to an even greater degree.  
In general, national leaders faced with the prospect of war stand firm with their 
existing policies if they believe that the other side will retreat if they stand firm in their 
policies, and that concessions will be terribly costly. Moreover, they choose conciliation 
if they believe that firmness will likely lead to war, and that the other side will be 
satisfied if it receives reasonable concessions (Jervis 1979).  The same type of logic can 
be applied to the situation the leader of the target nation who is taken “hostage” by the 
threat of future attacks faces. The leader must determine whether the costs of standing 
firm with their existing policies and facing an attack (i.e. not paying the ransom) are 
greater than conceding to the terrorists demands (i.e. paying the ransom) and avoiding 
any future attacks.  
 Terrorists are often faced with a situation in which they must decide between two 
targets to attack. As previously discussed, terrorists make well-calculated decisions as to 
which target they will attack based on the perceived payoffs, and are willing to substitute 
one mode or venue of attack for another based on changes in the security environment. 
The target they decide upon is the one which they believe will be the most likely to make 
a desired concession.  Figure 1 a simple game tree model, represents the situation 
terrorists face when deciding which of two targets to attack. 2  
In this situation, the terrorist can either target nation A or B.  If attacked, nation 
A decides whether or not to concede to the terrorists demands or whether to deny the 
                                                 
2 All figures and tables can be found in the Appendix. 
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terrorists their desired concession.  The same logic follows for nation B.  On the surface 
this game is very straightforward and simple to understand.  However, my purpose is to 
examine why a terrorist group may choose to attack the ally or trading partner of a 
powerful nation in an effort to force the more powerful nation, also the primary target, to 
make the terrorists‟ desired concessions.  Figure 1 serves as a useful tool in considering 
why such an incident would occur.  In Figure 1, nation A represents the primary target of 
a terrorist organization.  A concession from this nation in the form of a policy change is 
the primary goal of the terrorists.  Nation B represents an ally or trading partner of nation 
A.  The terrorist organization‟s purpose in targeting nation B is to force  
concessions from that nation which will in turn negatively affect nation A, the primary 
target of the terrorists, eventually forcing A into making concessions as well. For the 
purpose of this paper, the concession from nation B that the terrorists desire is for that 
nation to break its foreign policy and economic ties with nation A. 
 The obvious question then is why the terrorists would target their secondary 
target as opposed to directly attacking their primary target in hopes of a concession.  
This logic follows the substitution effect framework outlined above.  Numerous works 
have discussed how direct terrorist attacks on a nation, particularly a powerful nation 
such as the United States, increase the resolve of that nation to combat terrorism (Walt 
2001; Crenshaw 2004). This resolve comes primarily through an increased willingness 
to use military force against terrorist organizations and through the implementation of 
greater security measures by the target government. This increase in resolve signals to 
the terrorists that direct attacks against the powerful, primary target will not lead to the 
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terrorists‟ desired concessions from the target government. With this in mind, terrorists 
must decide upon a new method of strategic coercion to instill against the primary target.    
Going back to Figure 1, terrorists may turn to nation B, the secondary target, for 
an attack due to their belief that a direct attack on nation A will be unsuccessful in terms 
of achieving their primary goal. Nation B, the weaker nation of the two, will likely have 
a much lower threshold of the two for the amount of damage they can withstand from a 
potential terrorist attack.  Based on their perceived credibility of the terrorists threats of a 
future attack established through their past actions, nation B‟s leaders may have no 
choice but to concede to the terrorists due to the belief that standing firm in their policies 
will be more costly than the necessary concessions. The question then is why would the 
decision to attack the secondary target matter? More specifically, what impact would 
attacking the ally or trading partner of the primary target have on forcing the primary 
target into making a concession? 
Just as scholars and policy makers are aware of the nature of the “War on 
Terror”, so too are terrorist organizations.  Terrorists are aware that the United States, or 
any other great power, cannot completely eradicate terrorist operations alone. As 
previously discussed, as long as there is a “weakest link” present in a security policy to 
combat terrorist actions, terrorists will be able to exploit it.  Therefore, a key for a 
terrorist organization would be to attempt to eliminate support for counterterrorism 
operations. As we saw in the case of Spain and their discontinued support of U.S. led 
efforts in the Middle East after the attacks in Madrid, one of the most effective ways of 
achieving this goal is through a direct attack on an ally in the War on Terror‟s homeland.  
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If the allies and trading partners (i.e. nation B in Figure 1) of a primary target (i.e. nation 
A in Figure 1) become weary of having a close association with the powerful nation due 
to the threat of terrorist attacks and break their ties with that nation, which is the 
concession the terrorists desire from the secondary target, the primary target could find 
itself in an isolationist position in its counterterrorism efforts.  
If this situation were to occur, the primary target would face a decision, concede 
to the terrorists, or continue forward without making a concession, in turn continuing to 
lose the support of important allies in the international community and essentially 
fighting a battle that cannot be won.  Following this theoretical framework, one can see 
why terrorists, engaging in strategic coercion may choose to attack the ally or trading 
partner of their primary target in an effort to indirectly force the primary target into 
making concessions. 
 In order to test my expectations, I examine a nation‟s economic and foreign 
policy ties with the United States and how these ties affect that nation‟s vulnerability to 
transnational terrorist attacks.  Numerous scholars across various fields have used data 
concerning the United States as the primary method of investigation in their work not 
only due to availability but also due to the United States‟ status as an extremely powerful 
and high profile nation. As far as terrorism literature is concerned, scholars have often 
focused on the United States for these same reasons listed above, but in terms of why 
terrorists would choose to directly target the United States.  The level of power, 
influence, and visibility that the United States experiences, combined with the fact that 
the United States has experienced numerous powerful and influential allies whom, if 
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they broke their ties with the United States, could potentially alter the United States‟ 
ability to successfully engage in counterterrorism operations makes the United States an 
ideal example of nation A discussed above.  
This theoretical framework leads to the following hypotheses: 
Hypothesis 1: The closer economic and foreign policy ties a nation has with the United 
States, the more likely that nation is to experience transnational terrorist attacks in its 
homeland. 
My first hypothesis follows the theoretical framework developed in the previous 
section.  Acting within the strategic rational-actor framework, terrorist organizations 
may target allies and trading partners of the United States in an effort force the United 
States to alter its policy stance.  
Hypothesis 2:  Vulnerability to transnational terrorist attacks for nations with economic 
and foreign policy ties to the United States has increased post-Cold War. 
Another hypothesis to be examined is that the vulnerability to transnational 
terrorist attacks for nations with economic and foreign policy ties to the United States 
has increased post-Cold War.  David Rapoport (2002) describes four waves of rebel 
terror that have been seen throughout the globe.  The two waves of interest for this 
project are the third, “New Left Wave”, best described as a period of “international 
terrorism”, and the fourth wave, known as the “religious wave”.  These waves of terror 
and the events of these time periods provide the basis for this expectation.  The third 
wave was a period characterized by extreme anti-Western imperialism and state-
sponsored terrorism (Cronin 2002).  Many of these groups that served as the main 
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driving force of terror activity in the 1970‟s and 1980‟s were motivated by 
revolutionary, which were often communist, motives spurred greatly by Soviet 
sponsorship and support.   
However, despite some success by these groups, scholars such as Cronin (2002) 
have argued that the aspirations of many of these revolutionary organizations were not 
fully realized due in large part to the fact that they often did not have a common 
denominator to help them work together except to hinder “Western imperialism.”  This 
overriding ideology was undoubtedly strong between these groups, but it did not help the 
organizations to come up with a criterion of certain goals that all would seek to 
accomplish due to the fact that these organizations, most of which were associated with a 
particular state or nation, had their own individual goals as their top priority.   
The fourth wave, known as the “religious”, or “jihadist” wave was spawned by 
the Iranian Revolution of 1979 and the Soviet defeat in Afghanistan not long after 
(Cronin 2002).  As the third wave began to weaken in the 1980‟s as revolutionary 
terrorists were defeated in one country after another (Rapoport 2002), religious terrorists 
began to take over the international terror scene.  As Hoffman (1998) reports, since 1980 
the number of religious based groups has increased as a proportion of active terrorist 
groups: 2 of 64 groups in 1980; 11 of 48 groups in 1992; 16 of 49 groups in 1994; and 
25 of 58 groups in 1995. Islamic terror groups, with anti-American and anti-Western 
goals and aspirations, have provided the majority of attacks and membership during this 
period. This new wave began to increase in strength throughout the 1990‟s and the 
strength of this new wave reached a pinnacle on September 11, 2001 which Rapoport 
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(2002) describes as not only the most destructive day in the history of rebel terror, but 
the most important as well. Moreover, the rise of this fourth wave of rebel terror 
coincides with the transition of the nature of terrorism from primarily domestic to 
transnational that occurred in 1994 (Enders and Sandler 1999). 
Due to the rise of the jihadist wave of terrorism combined with the increasing 
amount of terrorism which is transnational in nature over this time, I expect to see that 
nations with economic and foreign policy ties to the United States face an increased 
vulnerability to transnational terrorist attacks post-Cold War. 
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4. RESEARCH DESIGN AND MEASURES 
 I test my expectations using the ITERATE (International Terrorism: Attributes of 
Terrorist Events) dataset (Mickolous et. al. 2004) of 2172 transnational terrorist 
incidents in 83 nations between 1968 and 2000.  My dependent variable is a count 
variable of all transnational terrorist incidents, as previously defined, in a nation for a 
given year.  I call this variable Incidents3.  
The key explanatory variables I include to represent a nation‟s economic and 
foreign policy ties with the United States include the amount of military and economic 
aid the target nation receives from the United States, the target nation‟s dependency on 
the United States for trade, and whether the target nation has an alliance with the United 
States.   
Military Aid (Logged) and Economic Aid (Logged) are both continuous measures 
of U.S. aid to a target nation.  The variables are measured in constant 2005 US dollars.  
The data for these variables were collected from the U.S. Agency for International 
Development (USAID)‟s online Greenbook.  For the purpose of this paper, the variables 
are measured in hundreds of thousands of dollars given by the United States to a target 
nation. My expectation is that a nation‟s vulnerability to transnational terrorism 
increases with the amount of military and economic aid they receive from the United 
States. 
                                                 
3 I recognize that this does not take into account the magnitude of the terrorist attack.  For this paper, I am 
interested in whether or not nations with ties to the United States are more likely to be the target of 
transnational terrorism. I am not concerned with how these ties may affect the strategy employed by the 
terrorists, which is directly tied to the magnitude of the event.  I hope to explore this dynamic in future 
research. 
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Trade Dependence is a measure of a target nation‟s dependency on trade with the 
United States which comes from Gleditsch (2002). Gleditsch codes bilateral trade flows 
for all country dyads between 1948 and 2000 measured in millions of current-year U.S. 
dollars. I use his data on US bilateral trade flows in order to create a measure of trade 
dependence on the U.S. This was done by adding exports from the target to the U.S. with 
imports from the U.S. to the target and dividing that figure by the target state's total 
trade. The result is a ratio of how dependent is the target on the U.S. as a trading partner. 
I expect to see that nation‟s with a strong dependence on the U.S. as a trading partner are 
more vulnerable to transnational terrorism. 
Alliance is a dichotomous measure of whether or not a nation has an alliance 
with the United States.  This information was gathered through the use of the EUGene 
Data Management Program (Bennett Jr and Stam III 2002).  The information for alliance 
type is coded from the COW alliance data (Gibler and Sarkees 2004), with 1 
representing a defense pact with the U.S., a 2 representing neutrality, a 3 representing an 
entente, and a 4 representing the absence of an alliance. However, I am only concerned 
only concerned with whether or not an alliance is present, not the type, therefore the data 
was recoded into a 1 if an alliance is present, and 0 if an alliance is not present. My 
expectation is that nations allied with the United States are more likely to experience 
transnational terrorist attacks than those which are not.  
 To address the possibility that the observed correlations between these measures 
of a nation‟s economic and foreign policy ties to the United States and vulnerability to 
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transnational terrorism are spurious, I control for a range of conditions that the literature 
suggests are determinants of transnational terrorism. 
 Government Capability is a measure of the amount of resources a government 
controls that could theoretically be applied to contend with or control terrorist activities 
(Koch and Cranmer 2007). This measure is taken from the Correlates of War (COW) 
national capabilities index (Singer, Bremer, and Stuckey 1972; Singer 1987). The 
composite index of national capabilities (CINC) is a weighted average of a state‟s share 
of the international system‟s total and urban populations, energy consumption, iron and 
steel production, military personnel and expenditures. It is important to control for a 
nation‟s capabilities for a variety of reasons. For example, a powerful nation‟s 
capabilities may generate hostility from foreign citizens, making it a more attractive 
target of terrorist action (Sandler and Lapan 1988).  Also, terrorist organizations may see 
a powerful nation as an attractive target due to the potential media exposure that may 
result from an attack on a highly visible and influential target (Li 2005).   
Democracy is a dichotomous variable used to indicate whether a nation is a 
democracy or not. Data for the democracy measure comes from the Polity IV dataset 
(Jaggers and Gurr 1995). A nation with a score of seven or higher is coded as a 
democracy and a nation with a score of less than seven is coded as a non-democracy. 
Numerous works focused on the potential impacts, both positive and negative that being 
a democratic nation can have on a nation‟s vulnerability to transnational terrorism 
(Eubank and Weinberg 1994; Li 2005; Sobek and Braithwaite 2005; Koch and Cranmer 
2007).  I use these data to create a dichotomous variable for democracy; a score of seven 
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or higher is coded as a democracy and a score of less than seven is coded as a non-
democracy. 
Conflict is a dichotomous measure of whether a nation is engaged in interstate 
military conflict or war using the Upsalla data (Gleditsch et al. 2002). It may be that 
nations involved in a conflict are more vulnerable to transnational terrorist attacks than 
those which are in times of peace. This measure equals one if a nation is engaged in 
a conflict and zero if it is not. 
Lebanon is a variable controlling for the influence and leverage of the nation of 
Lebanon in the sample.  The average number of transnational terrorist attacks a nation 
receives in a given year is 2.38.  Meaning, on average, a nation in the sample 
experiences slightly over two terrorist attacks per year from 1968 to 2000.  As for 
Lebanon, it experienced an average of 26.24 terrorist incidents per year during the 
sample.  Moreover, during a five year period from 1982 to 1986 during the height of the 
Israeli-Lebanese conflict, Lebanon averaged a staggering eighty attacks per year.  
Therefore, it is important to control for Lebanon due to the strong leverage and influence 
this nation has as an extreme outlier in the sample (Gujarati 2003).4 
 Post-Cold War is a variable coded as 1 after 1991 (post-Cold War) and 0 before 
1991 (Cold War).5 I control for the post-Cold War period because of the possibility that 
transnational terrorist incidents display a different pattern and frequency post-Cold War 
                                                 
4 The results of the key explanatory variables in the analysis do not change substantively without 
controlling for Lebanon. 
5  I choose 1991 as the break point for the end of the Cold War period following previous examples (i.e. Li 
2005).  It is possible that I could include 1994 as the break point due to the shift to primarily transnational 
terrorist incidents as opposed to domestic, but I choose not to due to the substantially smaller sample size 
that would occur due to the existing data set.    
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(Enders and Sandler 1999).  Moreover, I include the variable in the analysis due to the 
fact that I am interested in the conditional effect of a nation‟s foreign policy and 
economic ties to the United States on its vulnerability to transnational terrorist incidents 
both during and after the Cold War.   
Because the dependent variable is event count, ordinary least squares (OLS) 
estimates can be inefficient, inconsistent, and biased (Long 1997). Therefore, the 
statistical method employed is a negative binomial population averaged AR(1) 
regression 
with robust standard errors. I employ the negative binomial method rather than the 
poisson due to the over dispersion of the dependent variable (Long 1997).6 The 
population averaged AR(1) model allows controls for both between country 
heteroskedasticity and within country autocorrelation over time. Terrorism scholars are 
often concerned about the temporal effect of a nation‟s history of transnational terrorist 
incidents on its vulnerability at the current time. Scholars have used various methods to 
control for this such as including a lagged dependent variable as a regressor to capture 
the impact of a nation‟s vulnerability to attacks in the previous year to their current 
vulnerability. However, the use of the lagged dependent variable with random or fixed 
effects is inappropriate statistically. If a lagged dependent variable is included as a 
regressor, then random effects estimators are biased, even asymptotically (Hsiao 2003). 
                                                 
6 The negative binomial differs from the Poisson regression by the addition of a residual variance 
parameter that captures over dispersion in the dependent variable (which occurs when the standard 
deviation is greater than the mean). 
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The population averaged regression with the AR(1) process allows for a similar 
correction without the estimation problems associated. Furthermore, my primary interest 
is the average effect of foreign policy and economic ties to the United States on nations‟ 
vulnerability to attacks not changes in individual nations over time. Therefore, a 
marginal approach to estimation with correlated data such as the population averaged 
approach is appropriate (Zorn 2001). Because terrorist incidents may affect many of the 
right-hand variables (e.g., Military Aid), all independent variables are lagged one year 
behind the dependent variable to control for possible simultaneity bias. 
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5. RESULTS 
 Models 1 and 2 of Table 1 present the results of the baseline model testing 
whether a nation‟s foreign policy and economic ties to the United States affect its 
vulnerability to transnational terrorist attacks.  From the results, we see that three of the 
key explanatory variables: military aid, economic aid, and the presence of an alliance 
with the United States are positive and statistically significant as my first hypothesis 
predicted.  That is, the greater the level of military aid and economic aid a nation 
receives from the United States, the greater its vulnerability to transnational terrorist 
attacks.  Moreover, those nations that have an alliance with the United States are more 
likely to be targets of attacks than those that do not.  The one key explanatory variable of 
interest that displays the opposite relationship than predicted is a nation‟s dependence on 
the United States for international trade.  This variable displays a significant negative 
relationship with transnational terrorist attacks signaling that the more dependent a 
nation is on the United States for trade, the less vulnerable that nation is to transnational 
terrorist attacks.   As for the controls, we see that increased government capability, being 
involved in an interstate conflict, and being a democracy all make a nation a more likely 
target of transnational terrorism.  Moreover, it appears that there was a lower rate of 
occurrence of transnational terrorist attacks during the post-Cold War period than during 
the Cold War. 
 While the results of Models 1 and 2 showing the basic relationships between the 
key explanatory variables and transnational terrorist attacks is useful, it is beneficial to 
examine the substantive effects of these relationships further to determine exactly what 
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they mean in terms of the number of terrorist attacks occurred by nations with these 
characteristics.  In order to do this, I test the marginal effect of the key explanatory 
variables at their minimum and maximum values on transnational terrorist attacks while 
holding all other variables constant at either their mean or modal value.  For example, 
the lowest amount of military aid received from the United States for any given nation in 
the sample is $0.  Therefore, I run a test to determine how many transnational terrorist 
attacks a nation would expect to experience if it did not receive any military aid from the 
United States and displayed the mean or modal values for all other variables in the 
model (i.e. not a democracy, not involved in a conflict, etc.).  This demonstrates the 
substantive effect of the amount of military aid a nation receives from the United States 
on the total number of terrorist attacks that nation is expected to experience in a given 
year.   
 The first variable we will consider is military aid received from the United 
States.  As we move from the minimum amount of military aid received to the 
maximum, we have an increase in the expected number of transnational terrorist attacks 
from 1.20 per year to 3.79.  For economic aid received from the United States, there is 
an increase from 1.16 attacks per year to 1.68 from the minimum amount received to the 
maximum.  For nations that do not have an alliance with the United States, holding other 
variables constant at their means, the expected number of transnational experienced is 
just under one, or .81.  For those nations with an alliance, the expected number of attacks 
is 3.35 per year.  Finally, when considering a nation‟s dependency on the United States 
for trade, the lowest dependence leads to an expected 1.50 attacks per year while the 
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maximum level of dependence leads to .63 attacks.  Also, I set all key explanatory 
variables to their minimum values while holding all controls constant in order to create a 
scenario in which a nation has no ties whatsoever to the United States in any of these 
foreign policy or economic areas.  The expected number of attacks a nation would be 
expected to experience in this scenario is .70 per year.  Following this, I set all 
explanatory variables at their maximum values to test the opposite scenario.  The 
expected number of transnational terrorist attacks a nation would be expected to 
experience in this scenario is 5.62.  This strong increase in the expected number of 
attacks is further evidence of the strength of the impact that strong foreign policy and 
economic ties to the United States can have a nation‟s vulnerability to transnational 
terrorism.   
  Despite the directionality of the impact of a nation‟s ties to the United States for 
international trade on its vulnerability to transnational terrorist attacks being the opposite 
of my expectations, the results of Table 1 provide strong support for my first hypothesis 
as well as the theoretical framework.  Overall, strong foreign policy and economic ties to 
the United States do appear to make a nation more vulnerable to transnational terrorist 
attacks.  However, this is not the full story. As indicated by my second hypothesis, I am 
also interested in the conditional effect of the post-Cold War period on the impact of 
these ties.   
 Table 2 examines this conditional effect in order to test my second hypothesis 
that nations with foreign policy and economic ties to the United States experienced an 
increased vulnerability to transnational terrorist attacks post-Cold War due to the rise of 
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the jihadist wave of transnational terrorism.  In order to test this effect I include 
appropriate interaction terms into the model.  From the results of Table 2, we see that 
during the Cold War a significant positive relationship existed between the amount of 
military aid received from the United States and a nation‟s vulnerability to transnational 
terrorism.  In contrast, during the post-Cold War period we see that there is actually a 
negative relationship present, although this relationship is not statistically significant.  
Figure 2 serves as a visual representation of the conditional effect of the amount of 
military aid received from the United States on a nation‟s vulnerability to transnational 
terrorist attacks during the post-Cold War period.  As the graph shows, during the post-
Cold War period nations receiving higher levels of military aid from the United States 
were at a lower level of vulnerability to transnational terrorist attacks than during the 
Cold War.  Looking at the impact of the amount of economic aid received from the 
United States, we see a positive, though not statistically significant relationship present 
during the Cold War, and a positive and significant relationship present during the post-
Cold War period.  However, as Figure 3 shows, from a substantive and statistical 
standpoint, nations receiving higher levels of economic aid from the United States were 
actually less vulnerable to transnational terrorist attacks than those receiving higher 
levels of economic aid during the Cold War period.  As for the impact of the presence of 
alliance with the United States on a nation‟s vulnerability to transnational terrorist 
attacks, a significant positive relationship is present during the Cold War period, while 
for the first time, a negative and significant relationship exists during the post-Cold War 
period.  Finally, we see that a significant negative relationship is present between the 
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level of dependence a nation has on the United States for international trade and its 
vulnerability to transnational terrorism during the Cold War while a positive yet non-
significant relationship is present during the post-Cold War period.  Figure 4 provides 
visual evidence of this conditional relationship.  The disparity in the effects of these key 
explanatory variables from one era to the next will be discussed further in the next 
section.   
Substantively, all the control variables display the same behavior as in Table 1.  
Overall, the results do not provide significant support for or against the expectations of 
my second hypothesis.  Nations with foreign policy and economic ties to the United 
States appear to be equally vulnerable to transnational terrorist attacks both during and 
after the Cold War period although due to different ties depending on the era.   
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6. DISCUSSION AND IMPLICATIONS 
 Overall, it seems that my theoretical framework and main hypothesis are correct.  
Nation‟s with strong economic and foreign policy ties to the United States are more 
vulnerable to transnational terrorist attacks.  Moreover, it seems that the effect of these 
various ties are conditional on the time period under examination.  A few examples of 
this from the analysis are worth consideration.  During the Cold War period my analysis 
indicates that nation‟s receiving higher levels of military aid from the United States were 
more vulnerable to transnational terrorist attacks while during the post-Cold War period 
this effect is not present.  Another interesting conditional effect is present when 
examining the impact of economic aid received from the United States. During the Cold 
War period, the amount of economic aid received from the United States appears to play 
a positive yet non-significant role in a nation‟s vulnerability to attacks while during the 
post-Cold War period a positive and significant effect is present. It should be noted, as 
shown in Figure 3, that a nation receiving higher levels of economic aid from the U.S. 
during the post-Cold War period was substantively and significantly less vulnerable to 
transnational terrorist attacks than during the Cold War period.  In addition, the presence 
of an alliance with the United States appears to play a significant role in determining a 
nation‟s vulnerability to transnational terrorist attacks albeit in different ways depending 
on the time period.  During the Cold War period, nations having an alliance with the 
United States are significantly more vulnerable to attacks while during the post-Cold 
War period the opposite effect is true.  Related, during the Cold War period nations with 
an increased dependence on trade with the United States experienced a lower 
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vulnerability to attacks, while during the post-Cold War period they experienced a 
greater vulnerability.  The conditional effects of the two foreign aid components (i.e. 
military and economic aid), the presence of an alliance, and the dependence on trade 
with the United States on a nation‟s vulnerability to transnational terrorist attacks are 
fruitful topics that should be examined in subsequent research. It does seem that there 
are conditional aspects to the impact of these various foreign policy and economic ties to 
the United States on a nation‟s vulnerability to transnational terrorism although not 
necessarily in the way in which I envisioned.  A possible extension of this research 
would be to develop a richer theoretical framework to explain why these specific 
conditional relationships exist.   
 The obvious next step in an analysis of this type would be to extend the time 
series of transnational terrorist attacks to include the post 9/11 period.  It would be 
extremely interesting to see if the trends seen in the analysis presented in this paper hold 
when the years of 2001 to the presents are added.  Specifically, it would be interesting to 
see if nations that have an alliance with the United States are still less vulnerable to 
transnational terrorist attacks during this time period as they appear to be during the 
post-Cold War era examined in this analysis (1991-2000).   The attacks in Spain and 
Great Britain discussed above would suggest that this trend might not be the case in the 
post 9/11 period.   
 Another promising topic for future research would be to examine the magnitude 
of an attack on the relationships between various economic and foreign policy ties with 
the United States observed in the analysis.  Perhaps terrorists are primarily targeting 
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nations with foreign policy and economic ties to the United States with high profile, high 
casualty attacks.   
 Overall, this analysis provides a clear, straightforward test showing that yes, 
nation‟s with strong foreign policy and economic ties to the United States do experience 
a higher vulnerability to transnational terrorist attacks.   
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7. CONCLUSIONS 
 The goal of this analysis was to test whether a nation‟s allies and trading partners 
affect its vulnerability to transnational terrorism.  Specifically, I wanted to uncover 
whether a nation‟s economic and foreign policy ties to the United States increased its 
vulnerability to transnational terrorist attacks.  Although numerous scholars had posited 
this theoretical framework, this study is the first to provide strong empirical evidence 
that this expectation holds.  The answer is yes, nations with strong foreign policy and 
economic ties to the United States are more vulnerable to transnational terrorist attacks.    
 Also, this study provides a new way to think about how different characteristics 
of a nation affect its vulnerability to terrorism.  As discussed above, scholars have 
focused on how numerous country specific characteristics such as regime type, power, 
and region may affect that nation‟s vulnerability to transnational terrorist attacks.  This 
analysis presents a new characteristic of nations to consider when attempting to 
determine how vulnerable a particular nation is to future transnational terrorist attacks, 
which is that nation‟s allies and trading partners. The continued analysis, both from a 
theoretical and empirical perspective, of terrorists‟ choice of targets and modes of attack, 
is needed to uncover more trends such as the ones presented in this  
analysis.   
From a policy perspective, the analysis should provide further proof that terrorist 
organizations are able and willing to find a weakest link in the international security 
environment and exploit it.  U.S. policy makers becoming more aware of the need for a 
consolidated global effort to combat the threat of transnational terrorism and have 
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implemented numerous policies in an attempt to bolster security levels and military 
capability to fight the terrorist threat in nations across the globe.  It could be that these 
nations receiving high levels of aid and support from the United States may actually be 
increasing their vulnerability by doing so.  Policy makers should be aware of these types 
of patterns in terrorist behavior and recognize that by attempting to bolster a nation‟s 
security environment to prevent them from being the “weakest link” they may actually 
be making that nation a more likely target of future attacks.   
Time will tell if terrorist organizations will continue to display the pattern of 
targeting allies and trading partners of the United States as shown in this empirical 
analysis and by the attacks on Spain and Great Britain.  More importantly, it will be 
interesting to see if nations with these ties continue to be targeted if more nations 
continue to follow in Spain‟s footstep and distance themselves from the U.S. led “War 
on Terror”.  If this were to happen, the United States may someday find itself isolated in 
its effort to fight a seemingly unwinnable battle not due to its own desire, but by other 
nations‟ fear of being guilty by association.   
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APPENDIX 
 
 
Table 1: Economic and Foreign Policy Ties to the United States and Vulnerability 
to Transnational Terrorist Attacks (Full Sample 1968-2000) 
 
 Model 1: Key Explanatory 
Variables 
Model 2: Full Sample with 
Control Variables Included 
Variable Coefficient 
(SE) 
Coefficient 
(SE) 
Military Aid 
 
.038** 
                     (.015) 
.126*** 
                           (0.15) 
 
Economic Aid .094*** 
                     (0.19) 
.046** 
                           (0.20) 
Alliance 1.24*** 
                     (.130) 
1.42*** 
                           (0.91) 
Target Dependence -1.09*** 
                     (.264) 
-.614*** 
                           (.205) 
Gov. Capability - 31.79*** 
                           (3.90) 
Conflict - .798*** 
                           (0.79) 
Democracy - .211** 
                           (0.83) 
Post-Cold War - -.343*** 
                           (0.83) 
Lebanon - 3.04*** 
                           (.237) 
Chi Square 
 
N= 
134.85*** 
 
2172(83) 
933.37*** 
 
2172(83) 
Notes: Negative Binomial Population Averaged AR(1) Regression with Robust Standard Errors. *p<.10, 
**p<.05, ***p<.01.  Note N= total observations with number of countries in parentheses. 
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Table 2: Economic and Foreign Policy Ties to the United States and Vulnerability 
to Transnational Terrorist Attacks (with Post-Cold War Interaction Terms 1968-
2000) 
 
  Full Sample w/ Post-Cold War Interactions 
Variable Coefficient 
(SE) 
 
Military Aid .135*** 
(.018) 
Economic Aid .024 
(.023) 
Alliance 1.62*** 
(.103) 
Target Dependence -.650*** 
(.238) 
Post-Cold War * Military 
Aid 
-.018 
(.033) 
Post-Cold War * 
Economic Aid 
.094** 
(.043) 
Post-Cold War * Alliance -.988*** 
(.197) 
Post-Cold War * Target 
Dependency 
.473 
(.429) 
Gov. Capability 31.45*** 
(3.80) 
Conflict .835*** 
(.078) 
Democracy .198** 
(.082) 
Cold War -.335* 
(.175) 
Lebanon 3.09*** 
(.230) 
Chi Square 
 
N= 
1051.70*** 
 
2172(83) 
Notes: Negative Binomial Population Averaged AR(1) Regression with Robust Standard Errors. *p<.10, 
**p<.05, ***p<.01. Note N= total observations with number of countries in parentheses. 
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Figure 1: Terrorists’ Choice of Targets 
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Figure 2: Marginal Effect of Military Aid Post-Cold War  
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Figure 3: Marginal Effect of Economic Aid Post-Cold War  
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Figure 4: Marginal Effect of Target Dependency Post-Cold War  
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